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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-4390

DR. BASANT CHATTERJEE,
Appellant
v.
PHILADELPHIA FEDERATION OF TEACHERS;
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA;
DAVID W. HORNBECK; JEANETTE W. BREWER;
JOYCE B. HARRISON; SHELDON JAHSS;
HENRY PARKS; MICHAEL NEIDERMAN;
JAMES LYTLE; JERRY T. JORDAN;
MAXINE STUTMAN

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 99-cv-4122
(Honorable Louis H. Pollak)

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 18, 2007
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 24, 2007)

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.
Appellant Dr. Basant Chatterjee, proceeding pro se, appeals the judgments of the
District Court granting in part Appellees’ motions to dismiss his complaint and denying
his claims against the School District of Philadelphia (“the District”) following a bench
trial. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
Appellant was employed by the District as a math teacher from 1973-1996. In
1993, while teaching at University City High School, Appellant took on several extracurricular appointments in addition to his teaching responsibilities. Among them, he
became the Director of the Health Small Learning Community. In the spring of 1994,
William Shumake became the principal of University City High School. Appellant
alleges that during the following term, Principal Shumake began to “harass and
discriminate against” him, and that he observed discrimination against Asian students in
the school. Appellant subsequently informed the local news media, which reported on the
alleged discrimination. In March 1995, Appellant filed a discrimination claim against
Principal Shumake with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”).
According to Appellant, in late March or early April of 1995, Principal Shumake
took a leave of absence from his job and was replaced by Dr. James Lytle, a former
Assistant Superintendent of Schools. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Lytle initiated a meeting with
Appellant at which he inquired about Appellant’s PHRC complaint. Following the
meeting, Appellant withdrew the complaint, explaining that the District “has taken

2

necessary steps against the administrator in the complaint.” According to Appellant, his
relationship with Dr. Lytle from April-June of 1995 was “cordial and satisfactory.”
Appellant alleges that, beginning in September 1995, he was subjected to
“harassment, intimidation, humiliation and discrimination” at the hands of Dr. Lytle. The
factual background underlying these claims is set forth at length in Appellant’s second
amended complaint. Briefly, Appellant maintains that he was stripped of his authority as
program director in favor of his assistant, his performance was evaluated via a survey of
other faculty members, he was criticized in his official performance record for failing to
address certain schoolwide problems, he was the only faculty member to receive a midyear performance evaluation, and he was denied compensation for time spent supervising
students during their lunch hour and for his extra-curricular work. He alleges that none of
the other program directors, all of whom were white, experienced such treatment. He
also alleges that he was made the focus of numerous investigations because of his
national origin and in retaliation for having previously complained of discrimination.
In the winter of 1995, Dr. Lytle initiated an audit of Appellant’s expenditures and
compensation. According to his testimony, the audit was prompted by a routine review of
W-2's of the employees under his supervision. Dr. Lytle claimed he was struck by
Appellant’s W-2, which reflected compensation of approximately $27,000 in excess of
his base salary, more than any other teacher at the school. Based on the results of the
audit, the Office of the Internal Controller concluded that between January and June
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1995, Appellant received multiple payments for certain hours, and was paid for hours he
was not entitled to be paid for, extra-curricular hours on days when he was absent from
his regular duties, and time which was not supported by sign-in records.
In response to the audit, Appellant, accompanied by Maxine Stutman, his
representative from the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers (“the Federation”), met with
District representatives in early February 1996. On February 12, Appellant provided Dr.
Lytle with a one-page response to the audit, and sent a letter to the Superintendent
requesting a meeting and indicating his intent to file another discrimination complaint
with the PHRC. Appellant did not copy Dr. Lytle on his letter to the Superintendent. On
March 28, Dr. Lytle conducted a further evaluation and rating of Appellant, in which he
determined his performance to be unsatisfactory, and incorporated updated findings from
a March 25 report from the Internal Controller’s Office. On April 1, Appellant sent a
second letter to the Superintendent, referring to his February 12 letter requesting a
meeting, and indicating that he had not yet received a response. The Superintendent
responded on April 8, copying Dr. Lytle, and stating that he would look into the matter.
In the interim, based on the results of the audit and the March 28 evaluation, Dr. Lytle
recommended that Appellant be relieved of both his administrative and his teaching
responsibilities. On July 18, 1996, after the Assistant Superintendent and the Deputy
Superintendent endorsed this recommendation, the District issued a letter to the Board of
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Education recommending Appellant’s termination. Appellant found a copy of this letter
waiting for him when he returned from summer vacation on September 1, 1996.
The letter from the Board of Education provided Appellant with two options: (i) to
request a hearing before the Board of Education within ten days of receipt of the letter, or
(ii) to grieve the recommended termination through the Federation’s grievance
procedures. On September 2, Appellant contacted Stutman, who explained the details of
the two options to him. Appellant sought to set up a meeting with her, but she declined,
stating that she had already given him all of the information she had. Appellant then tried
several times to contact her supervisor, who informed him that the Federation had already
told him whatever he needed to know to select an option, and that, since he was no longer
employed by the District, its services were no longer available to him.
On September 12, 1996, Appellant filed another discrimination charge with the
PHRC, which he amended on October 5, 1998. Both charges were cross-filed with the
EEOC. In October 1998, after securing counsel, Appellant requested a hearing before the
Board of Education, which was eventually scheduled for June 1, 1999. On May 28, 1999,
he withdrew his request for a hearing. On August 16, 1999, nearly three years after
receiving the initial letter from the District, Appellant filed the instant action.
As the District Court summarized in its October 2, 2001 opinion granting in part
Appellees’ motions to dismiss, Appellant alleged fifteen causes of action against the
District, the Federation, and a number of individual employees of both. The District
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Court dismissed all of Appellant’s claims against the Federation and most of his claims
against the District. It permitted Appellant’s claims against the District of: (i)
discrimination, hostile work environment harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act (“PHRA”),
and (ii) denial of the opportunity to elect continuation coverage in violation of the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”), to proceed to a bench
trial, after which it dismissed Appellant’s complaint. Appellant now appeals.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
the District Court’s partial grant of Appellees’ motions to dismiss de novo. See Alston v.
Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2004). With respect to the claims on which the
District Court entered judgment following a bench trial, we review its factual findings for
clear error, and subject its choice and interpretation of legal precepts to plenary review.
See Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 201 (3d Cir. 2005).
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: (i) dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and state law claims as time-barred; (ii) dismissal of his Title VII
and PHRA claims against the Federation; (iii) denial of his Title VII and PHRA claims
against the District; (iv) denial of his motion to amend his complaint; (v) denial of his
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motion to compel discovery; and (vi) failure to rule on his motion to stay or for a new
trial. We will address the merits issues first, followed by the procedural issues.1
Appellant first contests the District Court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983, 1985(3), and state law tort, breach of collective bargaining agreement, and duty of
fair representation claims as time-barred. In addressing these claims, the District Court
concluded that all of Appellant’s claims against the District accrued on September 1,
1996, when he received the letter from the Board of Education recommending that he be
terminated. Giving Appellant the benefit of the doubt, the District Court concluded that
the latest date on which his claims against the Federation could have accrued was May 7,
1997, the date on which, according to Appellant’s second amended complaint, he last
communicated with his Federation representative. Applying the two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury actions under Pennsylvania law to Appellant’s claims
under §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(3), the District Court concluded that all of his claims were
time-barred. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368-69 (3d Cir.
2000). The District Court similarly held that Appellant’s claims of breach of the duty of
fair representation against the Federation and breach of the collective bargaining
agreement against the District were subject to a six-month limitation period and were
likewise time-barred. See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65,

1

We will only address those issues raised by Appellant in his lengthy informal brief.
See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375,
398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief.”).
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172 (1983). Finally, the Court concluded that Appellant’s defamation, fraud, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and intentional interference with contractual relations
claims were also time-barred. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5523, 5524(7).
Appellant contests the dates used by the District Court to begin the limitations
period, arguing instead that the clock should begin to run from May 28, 1999, the date on
which Appellant withdrew his request for a Board of Education hearing. He maintains
that prior to that date, had he filed a lawsuit, it would have been dismissed for failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies. It appears that Appellant has confused the various
avenues of redress which were available to him. It is true that, as a public employee,
Appellant could not have contested the merits of his termination in court prior to the
conclusion of the Board of Education proceedings. See 24 P.S. §§ 11-1127, 11-1131, 111132. However, the merits of his termination are not at issue here; this is an action for
employment discrimination. Appellant was required to exhaust his remedies through the
EEOC prior to filing a federal lawsuit pursuant to Title VII. However, as the District
Court noted in its opinion, his pursuit of administrative remedies for his Title VII claim
did not operate to toll the limitations period for his §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), or state law
claims. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 466 (1975). Accordingly, we
agree with the District Court that all of these claims were time-barred.
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Appellant next contests the dismissal of his Title VII and PHRA claims against the
Federation.2 The District Court first dismissed all claims against employees of the
District and the Federation in their individual capacities. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). The Court further
dismissed Appellant’s claims with respect to the Federation, holding that he had failed to
allege facts from which an inference could be drawn that the Federation discriminated
against him. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973);
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285 (1976).
On appeal, Appellant alleges that the Federation is liable for his discharge because
it was aware that other non-white teachers had committed the same violations as
Appellant was terminated for and it therefore participated in the District’s cover-up of its
discriminatory practices. He further maintains that the Federation refused to meet with
him to discuss his options, while in the past it had offered such meetings to non-Asian
members, and that it did not file a grievance to contest his termination.
We agree with the District Court that Appellant failed to state a claim for
discrimination against the Federation. The Federation did not grieve Appellant’s
termination because he elected to pursue a Board hearing rather than the union’s
grievance procedure in response to his letter of termination. Appellant’s bare allegation

2

As the District Court noted, courts have interpreted the PHRA consistent with Title
VII. See Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 265 (3d Cir. 2006).
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that the Federation refused to offer him a meeting to discuss his options does not suffice
to state a claim under Title VII, particularly where the record reflects that the Federation
represented Appellant over the course of his disputes with Dr. Lytle and the District, and
discussed his options with him by telephone on more than one occasion. Finally, as will
be discussed herein, because we will affirm the District Court’s determination that
Appellant’s discrimination claims against the District lack merit, we cannot conclude that
his coextensive claims against the Federation should have been permitted to proceed.
Finally, Appellant contests the merits of the District Court’s denial of his claims of
discrimination and retaliation against the District, following a five-day bench trial. Based
on the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the District Court concluded that
Appellant had not carried his burden of proving that he was subject to harassment or
discrimination based on his national origin, or retaliation either for filing the March 1995
PHRC claim or for threatening to file another PHRC complaint in his February 12, 1996
letter to the Superintendent of Schools. While articulating some concerns regarding the
process by which the audit was conducted, the District Court, acting as the fact finder,
“accept[ed] the school system’s defense that it has put forward, and [found that it had]
articulated a ground for dismissal that has nothing to do – simply nothing to do with
plaintiff’s national origin, and nothing to do with the fact that the plaintiff had
complained initially about Mr. Shumake, and later about Dr. Lytle in a letter to – in letters
to – cumulative letters, February 12 and April 1, to the superintendent about Dr. Lytle.”
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The Court further found that Dr. Lytle’s actions could not be traced to Appellant’s filing
of the PHRC complaint against Principal Shumake, as “it addressed a whole scenario that
in school terms [was] long gone, and was withdrawn.” After the District Court accepted
the District’s defense as legally sufficient to overcome Appellant’s prima facie cases of
discrimination and retaliation, it concluded that Appellant had not met its burden of
persuading the Court that the District’s defense was pretextual. According to the Court,
the record did not reflect any bias of Dr. Lytle or any of the other relevant decisionmakers
towards people of Asian national origin. With respect to his retaliation claims, the Court
found that Appellant had not demonstrated that Dr. Lytle was aware of Appellant’s
February 12 letter when he issued his March 28 recommendation, and that there was no
evidence in the record to support a finding that the Superintendent’s decision had been
influenced by Appellant’s letters.
On appeal, Appellant essentially seeks to contest the entire factual basis for the
District Court’s decision. Our role, however, is not to re-try the evidence. Rather, our
review is limited to whether the District Court’s factual findings were “clearly
erroneous.” We have explained that “a finding is clearly erroneous if we are left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Gordon, 423 F.3d at
201. According, as we must, due deference to the trial court’s evaluation of the
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witnesses’ testimony and credibility, we are not left with such a conviction, and therefore,
cannot disturb the District Court’s factual findings.3
Appellant also challenges several procedural rulings of the District Court. First,
on March 19, 2004, more than two years after his claims against the Federation were
dismissed, Appellant requested leave to file an amended complaint, seeking to add claims
against the Federation for failure to arbitrate a wage claim which accrued in 1996.
Appellant contends that its refusal was discriminatory, constituted a breach of the duty of
fair representation, and was an intentional tort. The Court denied his motion. While
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend a pleading “shall be
freely given when justice so requires,” there was no basis for the Court to permit
amendment in this case, as Appellant’s claims against the Federation had already been
dismissed for failure to state a claim, and Appellant’s proposed amendment was no more
specific with respect to his discrimination claims than his original complaint had been.
Next, Appellant claims that the District Court erred in denying his motion to
compel discovery. In its order, the District Court explained that Appellant’s motion
would be denied without prejudice because, at a settlement conference before Magistrate

3

We also note that Appellant spends a significant portion of his brief addressing the
facts underlying the District’s decision to terminate him. As the District Court explained,
it found substantial flaws in the process by which the District reached its decision. These
flaws notwithstanding, the District Court acknowledged that its role was not to second
guess that decision, but only to determine if it was a pretext for an illicit motive, which
the Court found it was not. Similarly, the merits of the District’s decision are not before
us at the present time, and therefore we do not address Appellant’s arguments here.
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Judge Angell, Appellant had agreed to abandon his motion to compel and instead seek
answers to the questions posed in his interrogatories by questioning Defendant at trial.
Appellant does not contest this characterization of events in his informal brief, but instead
argues the merits of his motion. A district court has broad discretion in the conduct of
discovery. Pub. Loan Co., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 803 F.2d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1986).
To find an abuse of such discretion, “it is usually necessary to conclude that there has
been an interference with a ‘substantial right,’ . . . or that the discovery ruling is ‘seen to
be a gross abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental unfairness in the trial of the
case.’” Id. at 86 (quoting Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir.
1983)). No such abuse exists under the circumstances presented here.
Finally, Appellant challenges the District Court’s failure to rule on his motion “to
stay issuance of decision or vacate decision for the Defendant School District of
Philadelphia,” filed after completion of the bench trial and receipt of the Court’s oral
ruling. In his motion, he asked the Court to either consider the affidavit of, or give him
the opportunity to examine under oath, Barbara Pashak, a former fellow teacher at
University City High School who Appellant contacted after completion of the trial. While
the District Court failed to rule on this motion, we see no reason to remand.
Appellant captioned his motion as one to stay issuance of or vacate the District
Court’s decision. Nonetheless, we will look to the function of the motion, not its caption,
to determine what type of relief a litigant is seeking. See Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155,
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158 (3d Cir. 1988). Here, the relief requested by Appellant clearly falls under Rule 59(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that, “[o]n a motion for a new
trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make
new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment.” We have held
that such a motion may be based on “newly discovered evidence” if it: “(1) [is] material
and not merely cumulative, (2) could not have been discovered before trial through the
exercise of reasonable diligence and (3) would probably have changed the outcome of the
trial.” Compass Tech., Inc. v. Tseng Labs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1995).
The evidence Appellant sought to introduce does not meet these criteria. In his
motion, Appellant averred that he requested Barbara Pashak’s contact information from
the District but did not receive it, and that he called University City High School in
February 2005 and asked for her, but was told she did not work there. Then, when he
called again in April 2005, following the close of trial, he found that she did still work
there, and obtained an affidavit from her. The underlying lawsuit was initiated in August
1999. We question whether Pashak’s whereabouts truly “could not have been discovered
before trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” We need not reach this
question, however, because it is clear that Pashak’s testimony would not have changed the
outcome of the trial. Appellant explains that Pashak’s affidavit confirms his own
testimony and statement of the facts. However, the Court did not disbelieve Appellant’s
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testimony, and in fact, it criticized the way in which the decision to terminate Appellant
was reached. The Court nonetheless found that the District had acted in good faith in
reaching its decision. Pashak’s testimony would not have affected this assessment.
Because the “new evidence” Appellant sought to introduce would not have affected the
outcome of the trial, there was no basis on which the District Court could have granted
Appellant’s motion.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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